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Abstract 
The failure of the Somali state from 1993 to 2012 represents one of the world’s most 
profound and prolonged cases of state collapse. Initially, education and other government 
services came to a standstill. With the halt of fighting in some areas, local communities with 
the support of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other agencies began to 
provide education and other critical services. Since then, slow progress has been made in 
providing educational services to increasing numbers of children, developing community 
capacity to manage schools in the absence of government support, and developing regional 
and national administrative systems to continue development of the education system. 
UNICEF played a central role in these developments. This case study looks at UNICEF’s 
education programme in Somalia between 1991 and 2010. Highlighted are the contexts in 
which the programme operated, the challenges it faced, and the ways it adapted and learned.  
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Of central importance was the agency’s sensitivity to local context, its flexibility in 
programme responses, its willingness and ability to partner with available groups and 
agencies, its focus on helping the larger system get running, and its commitment to inclusion. 
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1 Introduction 
Twenty-eight million children, 40 per cent of the world’s total number of children not in 
school, live in countries affected by current or past armed conflict (UNESCO 2011). Most 
recent conflicts are within rather than between states, and the average duration is 12 years 
(UNESCO 2011). With such increases in intra-state conflicts, an escalating number of non-
state actors have emerged as parties to conflict contributing to their resolution at the same 
time when state failure has heightened the salience of state fragility (UNESCO 2011). 
Agencies involved in international development have been criticized for failing to devote 
sufficient funds to fragile contexts and areas affected by conflict. At the same time 
development agencies and governments have increasingly come to realise that the 
assumptions and modalities of development assistance in fragile contexts differ strikingly 
from those effective in development contexts. The international community is just beginning 
to learn ways to support development in environments where governments lack the capacity 
or will to be effective partners (UN and World Bank 2007). 
 
Located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia is the lost orphan of East Africa. It is arguably not a 
single country with a fragile state but rather several countries with varying levels of 
functioning statehood and fragility. Historically Somalia is the home of tribes who mainly 
lived a pastoral life—and who favoured Koranic education for their children. The Somalian 
area was colonized by the Italians (in the south and northeast) and the British (in the 
northwest). For some Somalis, colonization fostered an interest in the West and in the modern 
world economy—and hence in Western schooling. But the predominant cultural inclination 
was and is towards a traditional Islamic way of life, which represents diverse views toward 
formal schooling, especially of girls. Most children were schooled, if at all, in the Koranic 
schools run by religious leaders in most communities. 
 
In 1960, Somalia was granted independence and declared a state with its capital in 
Mogadishu, but the actual integration of the diverse areas was minimal. The demise of the 
Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1990 was followed by dissolution of a functioning central 
state. In its place were three different political directions. Somaliland has developed a 
functioning if fragile democracy. The Puntland has seen a strong leader with considerable 
legitimacy. And finally, the south, centered around Mogadishu, which has been a contested 
zone with several tribes vying for leadership, though with a recent consolidation of authority 
claiming a national mandate. 
 
Two decades without a functioning central government would seem to jeopardize the 
provision of social services including education: unsafe schools, destruction of infrastructure 
and instructional materials, and vulnerable teachers. But the respective governments have 
devoted some energy towards formulating policies and revitalizing education. Alongside 
these local governments, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
international organizations have persisted; among them UNICEF, which is generally regarded 
as having made considerable headway in both providing services and laying critical 
groundwork for the development of effective governance structures. 
 
Effectively lacking a national government from 1991 until very recently, Somalia is a pre-
eminent example of a fragile state. UNICEF remained the lead international agency 
supporting formal education services throughout this period. Doing so has entailed working, 
at different points, with diverse community organizations, government agencies, international 
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agencies, and NGOs. The formal education system remains among the least developed in the 
world. Still, it has moved from a condition of total collapse in 1991 to 2012, when over 
700,000 children were enrolled in school (a primary gross enrollment ratio of 22 per cent). 
The majority of funding is external or community-based, yet ministries of education have 
been constituted in each of the three zones of Somalia and they have produced ambitious 
forward-looking sector plans (See Government of Somalia n.d.; Puntland State of Somalia 
n.d.; Somaliland Government 2012). 
 
This case study overviews UNICEF’s experience as it developed and adapted approaches to 
working in the pre-eminently fragile environment of Somalia. UNICEF’s approach can be 
understood as an early and pioneering embodiment of many of the ideas subsequently 
articulated by the development community in, for example, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD DAC) 
principles for good engagement in fragile states and situations (OECD DAC 1997) and more 
recently by the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) in terms of 
conflict-sensitive education programming. 
 
This paper looks at UNICEF’s education programme in Somalia between 1991 and 2010, 
considering the context(s) in which the programme operated, the challenges it faced, and the 
ways it adapted and learned. While its record is not perfect, UNICEF remains the primary 
international agency working in education that was able to operate to scale throughout the 
period of instability, conflict, and collapse of central authority. By 2009‒10, Somalia had 
moved from a situation of total school system collapse to one in which more than 750,000 
children were enrolled in school. By 2012, the three zones had each established an education 
ministry, and the country received funding from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). 
UNICEF played a major role in these achievements, due, in large part, to its sensitivity to 
local context, its flexibility in programme responses, its willingness and ability to partner 
with available groups and agencies, its focus on helping the larger system get running, and its 
commitment to inclusion. 
1.1 Context 
Approximately 60 per cent of Somalia’s population is semi-nomadic pastoralists, organized 
into traditional clans. The overlay of British and Italian colonial administrations did little to 
penetrate the daily life of the majority of people, or develop a national consciousness. 
Independence in 1960 and the merger of the two former protectorates led to an initial period 
of nation-building during the decade, assassination of the president in 1969, and a bloodless 
coup in which Barre assumed leadership, establishing a military dictatorship under Marxist 
precepts. Over time, the moral authority and popular support for the regime fell, and by 1991, 
the country was in a state of civil war. 
 
Somalia experienced nearly two decades of civil unrest and war following the overthrow of 
Barre’s regime in 1991. The civil war in Somalia and the subsequent collapse of the central 
government and its institutions left Somalia one of the poorest countries in the world, and the 
Somali people deeply divided. During the civil war and its aftermath, villages and cities were 
indiscriminately bombed and looted, and basic services, such as water, health care, and 
education, collapsed. By 1998, the average life expectancy of a Somali was 43 years and the 
mortality rate for children under five exceeded 25 per cent. Prior to the war, Somalia had one 
of the lowest adult literacy rates in the world, a situation that was further exacerbated by the 
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continued instability. UNICEF reported in its 1998 State of the World’s Children that literacy 
rates for men and women in Somalia were 36 per cent and 14 per cent respectively (UNICEF 
1998). 
 
One result of the continued civil unrest has been that most skilled labourers and professionals 
either fled or were killed. Consequently, few of the members of the estimated four million 
strong workforces have any skills marketable in the formal sector. In addition, many young 
men and women between the ages of 15 to 25, whom in more a peaceful time, would have 
been learning job skills and professions, do not have any education and are illiterate. By 
2007, the overall gross secondary enrollment ratio was only 7.8 per cent, 4.9 per cent for 
females (World Bank 2013b). At the same time, most young children do attend Koranic 
schools based in local communities, which function somewhat like pre-primary schools in 
other countries, though with Arabic and the memorization of the Koran as primary focus. 
Even during the height of the conflict, these schools continued to operate in many 
communities, as conditions permitted. 
 
During the protracted conflict and instability, women and children have suffered 
disproportionately over the past two decades. Large numbers of children are orphaned, cope 
with physical or mental disabilities, and/or live with militia groups. Violence against women 
and girls is common, and female genital mutilation (FGM) remains widely practiced. 
Women’s traditional roles in Somali society are changing, however, particularly in urban 
areas, as the number of female-headed and female-supported households increase. Some 
women are able to take advantage of these new found opportunities, but most continue to 
struggle within a society where the status of women remains appallingly low. Child mortality 
rates are high with neo-natal, child, and under-five rates estimated at 28, 113, and 328 per 
thousand live births respectively, and maternal mortality remains one of the highest in the 
world, at an estimated 1,600/100,000. 
 
The Somali economy has been growing, despite the lack of a central government presence in 
many parts of Somalia. During the long period of conflict, the private sector took the lead in 
providing services such as water, telephones, and electricity. However, the imposition of two 
livestock import bans by the Gulf States since 1998 due to concerns over Rift Valley Fever, 
combined with an extended drought, has had a deleterious effect on the livestock sector, upon 
which approximately 70 per cent of all Somali households rely, either directly or indirectly. 
There is no animal health certification system in place and the number of trained and 
qualified Somali veterinarians is extremely low. In addition, although there is increased 
production and availability of food in the irrigated agriculture regions of Lower Shabelle, the 
purchasing power of rural pastoralists and urban unskilled labour has been seriously eroded 
over the past few years. 
2 Regional differences in geography, governance, and development 
Somalia is divided into three regions: the northwest zone (NWZ), which is the self-declared 
‘Republic of Somaliland’; the northeast zone (NEZ), which is the semi-autonomous 
‘Puntland State of Somalia’; and the central/south zone (CSZ). During the period of the 
study, each region was self-governing. As of August 2012, the FRS is the official government 
of the nation as a whole. It is centered in Mogadishu, in the CSZ with Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud as president. The central government is working to build national institutions, even 
as the regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland remain in place, and are more or less 
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active. The extent to which FRS will assume authority over the Somaliland and the Puntland 
remains unclear. Each region is unique, with its own individual character, challenges and 
constraints, as well as opportunities and possibilities. 
2.1 Northwest zone 
The NWZ of Somalia, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, borders on Djibouti to the 
west, Ethiopia to the south, the Gulf of Aden to the north, and the NEZ to the east. The civil 
administration estimates that the region’s population is approximately 3.5 million, an annual 
growth rate of 3.1 per cent, and a population density of 25 persons per square kilometer, but 
no census has been carried out in the region. Since 1998, there has been a substantial number 
of Somalis returning to the region from camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti. The destination for 
the majority of these returnees has been Hargeisa town, with smaller numbers settling in 
other urban centers such as Burao and Boroma. It is estimated that 55 per cent of the 
population is nomadic or semi-nomadic, with the remaining 45 per cent living in urban 
centers or rural towns. A civil administrative structure has been established, there is a 
separate currency, a growing economy, and the last widespread fighting in the region took 
place in 1995. In December 2002, elections for local district officials took place, and in April 
2003 Presidential elections were undertaken, both of which were peacefully conducted. The 
NWZ has a number of urban centers including Hargeisa, the political and business center, 
Berbera, the port on the Gulf of Aden, Boroma in the northwest along the Ethiopian border, 
and Burao, which has a major livestock market. A basic tax system is being established, and 
its revenue is being used to provide government services (Somaliland Government 2013). 
This zone has the most developed formal education system, even including a post-secondary 
teacher education institute. 
2.2 Northeast zone 
In 1998, the Puntland State of Somalia was established in the northeast region of the country, 
following a conference of local elders, with Abdullahi Yusuf elected as the region’s first 
President for a three-year term. In an effort to attract businesses and agencies into the 
southern sub-regions, the administrative center for the northeast was established in Garowe, 
while the town of Bossaso, located on the northern coast, is the primary business center and 
also has the region’s port. There are four main urban centers: Bossaso, Gardo, Garowe, and 
Galkayo. The region is bordered in the west by the NWZ, the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean 
to the north and east respectively, and the CSZ to the south. 
 
The NEZ was relatively quiet until mid-2001, when confusion over the leadership broke out 
at the end of June. Abdullahi Yusuf and the former chief justice, Yusuf Haji Nur, both 
claimed to be president. The controversy started after Abdullahi Yusuf, whose term was to 
have ended on 30 June, claimed that his mandate had been extended by the parliament. A 
meeting of the region’s traditional elders in July 2001 rejected Abdullahi Yusuf’s extension, 
and named Yusuf Haji Nur as acting president until an election of a new administration was 
held. On 14 November, the elders subsequently convened a general congress for this purpose 
and elected Jama Ali Jama for president. Forces loyal to President Abdullahi Yusuf travelled 
north from Galkayo and they eventually re-asserted Yusuf’s control over the region (Puntland 
State of Somalia 2013). 
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There are no recent population figures for the zone, but in 1995, the population was estimated 
to be 2.5 million, with approximately 45 per cent of the population under the age of 14. There 
has been a limited return of the region’s residents, either from other parts of Somalia or 
outside the country. Similar to the NWZ, livestock production dominates, with only limited 
agricultural production for household use or marketing in urban centers based on oasis 
farming. Apart from livestock, the major export of the region is frankincense, which is 
harvested in the mountains.  
2.3 Central/south zone 
Only recently has the CSZ of Somalia re-established a centralized administrative structure, 
with an improvement in the security situation, which, nonetheless, remains fluid. In 2000, a 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was established as a result of the Djibouti-sponsored 
Arta Peace Process, which included broad representation from amongst the various Somali 
clans. The TNA in turn selected a Transitional National Government (TNG), and it was 
hoped that this would result in a cessation of interclan fighting. The situation remained 
unstable for most of the period of study, but in 2012, the TNG was unable to establish 
security or develop effective government institutions. This was in part due to the fact that, 
unlike the NWZ and NEZ, which have either a single or limited number of clans, the CSZ is a 
patchwork of clans and sub-clans, many of whom had been affected by the Barre regimes 
efforts to fragment the clans in the 1980s. In 2004, a second interim government, the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic was established. The 
transition process ended in August 2013, when clan elders appointed members to a new 
parliament, which elected a president and led to the current government, the Federal Republic 
of Somalia (FRS) (CIA 2013). 
 
As a result of continued insecurity, there has been little, if any, widespread infrastructure 
rehabilitation, with roads in a state of total ruin, electricity and telecommunications supplied 
through private business in areas where a sufficient market exists, and water systems 
rehabilitated on a local basis only. The only major exception to this has been the 
rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure along the Shabelle River, funded by the United 
States Government and European Commission. This rehabilitation resulted in an increase in 
agricultural production in the area, and Lower Shabelle is seen as largely food self-sufficient. 
 
Nevertheless, the region is also characterized by a vibrant and growing economy, centered on 
Mogadishu, but linked to other major centers in the region. The population, which is 
approximately four to five million people, is concentrated along the rivers and in the urban 
centers. Services in smaller towns and villages, particularly in the more densely populated 
Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, and Lower Juba regions, are more widely available than in 
the rural communities, particularly those in remote areas (Somaliland Government 2013). 
Formal education is the least extensive in this zone. 
 
The three zones in Somalia have long been characterized as development, transition, and 
emergency for the NWZ, NEZ, and CSZ respectively. In the NWZ and NEZ, established civil 
administrative structures provide a framework for implementation that has been lacking until 
recently in the CSZ. Access to rural areas due to the poor conditions of the roads in all 
regions can be difficult, although in the case of CSZ, access is further hindered by the limited 
ability of agencies to effectively operate through road transport over a wide area. 
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The vibrancy of the business sector throughout Somalia has resulted in private interests 
becoming involved in providing education services, particularly in urban areas where their 
catchments can be quite large. Establishing education services in remote or pastoralist 
communities can be difficult, labour intensive, and costly to set up, and therefore, be more 
suited to a civil administrative structure or international agency. 
3 Constraints and facilitating conditions for educational development 
For most of the past two decades, Somalia has been characterized by a series of conditions 
unconducive to educational development (UNICEF 2002): 
 
1. Violence within many parts of the country and a fragile peace in other areas. 
 
2. Lack of a unified government structure at the national level. 
 
3. A dispersed population and poor infrastructure making logistics costly and complex. 
 
4. A host of service-providing organizations with different strategies, missions, and 
modes of operation, leading to gaps, duplication, and competition. 
 
5. Low levels of basic skills on the part of the population and a lack of training 
infrastructure, resulting in poor service. 
 
6. Short time frames for international assistance, due to the unstable situation on the 
ground, and the emergency nature of much of the assistance. 
 
7. Corresponding low level of ownership on the part of Somalis of external projects. 
 
These issues represent the conditions identified by researchers and practitioners as 
characteristic of fragile contexts, often those affected by conflict, where governments lack the 
will and/or capacity to provide essential services to the population. The starkness of the 
Somalia case helped crystalize the notion of the failed state. Education, in such contexts, is 
both affected by fragility and a cause (or cure) of it. Such issues are the focus of recent work 
in conflict-sensitive programming in education (see INEE 2013) and other sectors.  
 
At the same time, there were positive conditions as well. Somali communities have long ago 
wearied of conflict and have shown themselves to be eager to take part in development work 
when possible. The collapse of government has led to a lack of services typically provided by 
government. In this vacuum, a number of NGOs and private providers have emerged to 
provide local services. Most utilities, for example, are provided by non-state entities. NGOs 
in particular, are often headed by women. As a consequence, a vibrant civil society has 
emerged in Somalia. Such an entrepreneurial environment bodes well for sustainability of 
desired services. The range of civil society organizations means that services can be reached 
and be managed at the local level. Clans provide a strong base of mutual aid and sharing, 
with certain traditional protections for the vulnerable. Koranic schools, many of which 
operate much like early childhood education centers, continued to function through the 
conflict and provide a legitimate and widely-accepted institutional foundation for education. 
UNICEF and other agencies have had some success in broadening the curricula of such 
schools in collaboration with local leaders. More recently, governmental structures that have 
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emerged in the Somaliland and the Puntland permit longer-range planning and the possibility 
of sustained development. Agencies working in Somalia have long recognized the need for 
co-ordination and have taken steps to maximize co-operation and coverage. Conflict was 
neither constant nor everywhere, and there were many opportunities for local developments 
and initiative. And in many ways, Somalis have shown themselves quite open to innovation 
(UNICEF 2002). 
3.1 Education 
As in many societies, Somali children have historically been instructed through informal oral 
traditions and practices. Somalia is an Islamic society and Islamic educational institutions 
were prevalent in the past and still are. Most children attend Koranic schools instead or in 
addition to any formal secular schooling. During the colonial period, the British introduced 
an English educational system in the northwest, and the Italians introduced an Italian system 
elsewhere. At independence, the country had 200 primary schools and 12 secondary schools, 
each with its own history and standards, using various languages, different curricula, and 
teaching methods (UNICEF n.d.). By the early 1970s, an integrated formal school system 
was established with the assistance of donors with some 1,400 primary schools, perhaps as 
many as 60 secondary schools (some of which were boarding schools to provide access for 
children from rural areas), several vocational-technical institutes, a national teacher education 
center, and a national university. Somali became a written language using the Latin alphabet, 
and a large-scale literacy programme was undertaken. By the mid-1970s, however, most 
western assistance was abandoned when the new government developed close relations with 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
 
In 1981, official statistics show that 152,429 students enrolled in grades one to four in 729 
primary schools, 34.1 per cent of whom were female. In the same year, 87,487 students were 
enrolled in intermediate education (grades five to eight) in 628 schools, of whom, 38.7 per 
cent were female (Ministry of National Planning 1984). By way of contrast, there were an 
estimated 5,480 Koranic schools in the country, enrolling students from four or five years old 
up to as high as 14 years old, though most students, especially girls, left before then. 
Enrollments in the formal schools appear to have varied substantially. For example, see  
Table 1 for the reported range of first grade enrollments between 1975 and 1982. 
Table 1: First grade enrollments from 1975‒76 to 1981‒82 
Year Enrollments 
1975‒76 133,605 
1976‒77 68,256 
1977‒78 41,631 
1978‒79 62,963 
1979‒80 48,272 
1980‒81 59,808 
1981‒82 47,507 
Source: Ministry of National Planning (1984). 
 
The Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977‒78 drew government resources away from education 
and the system moved towards collapse. Enrollment dropped, schools were closed, and 
teachers sought employment elsewhere. By 1990, only 600 schools remained open, enrolling 
150,000 children (UNICEF n.d.). The nation plunged into conflict. By 1991, when the civil 
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war broke out, the education system had already been severely crippled by internal conflicts 
that created an increasingly unstable and insecure environment. 90 per cent of the country’s 
school buildings were destroyed, virtually no instructional materials were available, and 
teachers and students had abandoned the educational process, many displaced by the conflict. 
For two years, Somalia had virtually no formal schooling (UNICEF n.d.). In 1993, schools 
began to open, operated by local communities or teachers. Informal education committees 
were established in some areas. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and UNICEF began to reprint existing primary school textbooks 
and teachers’ guides. UNICEF provided in-service training for teachers and distributed 
school kits. International agencies and NGOs provided funding, training, and supervision in 
some localities. Schools were rehabilitated by communities, international agencies, and 
NGOs (UNICEF n.d.). 
 
Violence and instability continued to plague the country, particularly in the CSZ. Yet 
communities, local and international NGOs, and international agencies, particularly UNICEF, 
continued to offer education in pockets of stability. As stability and security has increased, 
there has been corresponding growth in enrolment rates. Observers report strong local interest 
with many communities taking initiative. Reflecting popular demand, donors are showing 
renewed interest in education believing it is both a force for reconciliation and an investment 
in the future. Donors began to pay more attention to the education sector, indicating a shift 
away from an emergency mindset towards a more development oriented approach (UNICEF 
n.d.). 
 
Still, Somalia has the world’s lowest rates of educational participation. Despite recent 
increases, Somalia has a primary gross enrollment ratio of 22 per cent. Approximately four-
fifths of Somalis cannot read or write. Female school participation and literacy rates are half 
that of men (World Bank 2013b). One in eight of those who complete primary school are 
female (World Bank 2007). 
4 UNICEF’s education programme 
UNICEF resumed work in Somalia in 1993, helping to rehabilitate school buildings,  
re-printing existing textbooks, and providing school kits (a very basic set of instructional 
materials enabling a teacher to begin teaching). While useful in emergency contexts, parents 
and communities wanted more. In 1997, UNICEF initiated an education programme in 
Somalia. 
 
UNICEF’s programme has emphasized formal primary education as the foundation for an 
education system, which is the main focus here. In addition, however, UNICEF developed 
non-formal educational programmes for out-of-school youth and children (UNICEF n.d.). 
These programmes included a non-formal education initiative targeting nomadic children 
using Alternative Basic Education (ABE) materials, and an integrated Koranic school project 
in Puntland and Somaliland. 
 
Given the effective absence of government as partner, UNICEF used partnership-based 
strategies to provide services in local areas. Partnerships include work directly with 
communities; arrangements with local and international NGOs; contracts with private 
businesses; and work with various local authorities as well al zonal government structures 
(UNICEF 2002). Though conflict and instability have scarred the country for the past 20 
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years, conflict has not been uniform. UNICEF implemented its programme as opportunities 
opened up during periods (or specific localities) of relative peace, as regional governments 
developed capacity, and as new development agencies began to work in the country. 
 
UNICEF developed, tested, and scaled-up a relatively standard package of interventions, but 
was able to vary the introduction of different components according to the capacity of 
partners and conditions on the ground. The agency administered its programmes through 
zonal offices in each of the three zones as well as four sub-zonal offices in the CSZ. As a 
result, UNICEF was able to provide services, directly or indirectly, in most areas of the 
country (UNICEF 2010; Cummings 2003; UNICEF 2002; UNICEF n.d.). 
 
Initially focusing almost exclusively on delivery of services at the community level in 
response to the emergency situation, UNICEF increasingly began to supplement this with 
work at systemic levels as well, co-ordinating activities with other government structures as 
possible and with NGOS and development agencies working in the country (UNICEF 2010; 
Cummings 2003; UNICEF 2002). 
4.1 Components of the education programme 
Over time, UNICEF developed a number of components to its education programme, 
introduced at different times according to capacity, need, and access. These components 
included the following: 
School kits  
UNICEF’s initial response to the conflict in Somalia was the provision of education kits in 
1993. These kits contained a minimum set of instructional materials, and were designed to 
enable a teacher to provide instruction in any safe environment without the requirement of a 
conventional school building or administrative support. The school kits were both welcomed 
and controversial. A 1998 review found that the kits were of limited use in many 
circumstances and, having been sourced externally, were not sustainable. As a result, 
revisions were made and a teachers/school kit was developed alongside a pupil kit for 40 
children (including chalk, pencils, crayons, pens, slates, and notebooks). Kits were initially 
distributed to all primary schools in the country in 1999 and in subsequent years. They played 
an important role in starting up education initiatives during the crisis phase. However, as time 
went on, it became obvious that additional activities were necessary (UNICEF n.d.).  
Curriculum and textbooks 
By 1993, few schools were standing. Instructional materials were almost non-existent. Those 
materials that did exist, consisted of isolated textbooks from Somalia and elsewhere, in 
multiple languages, and often outdated. Very few children or schools had access to a 
complete set of age- and language-appropriate textbooks. Initially, UNICEF together with 
UNESCO Programme of Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) copied 
existing textbooks for distribution and use. However, with awareness of the limitations of 
existing materials, UNICEF initiated a complete curriculum revision process for lower 
primary education in Somalia. As a result, 24 syllabi and textbooks were prepared for grades 
one to four in six subject areas—Somali language, Arabic, mathematics, science, social 
studies, and Islamic studies. Curricular materials were developed, which could be used in 
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both Koranic schools as well as formal primary schools (UNICEF 2010; UNICEF 2002; 
UNICEF n.d.). 
 
UNICEF was committed to child-centered pedagogy, gender equity, and an inclusive process 
where all points of view were welcomed. As a result, 40 Somali educationalists were 
organized into a curriculum revision team, which spent two years in a far-reaching 
consultative process that led to broad support for the new textbooks, which included, notably, 
images of girls as well as boys. UNICEF organized the effort in collaboration with UNESCO 
and financial support from western and international donors. Textbooks were made available 
to schools throughout the country (UNICEF n.d.). In 2010, for example, textbooks and school 
supplies reached 80 per cent of schools in the NEZ, 70 per cent of schools in the NWZ, and 
47 per cent of schools in the CSZ (UNICEF 2011). 
Training teachers 
A third major component of the education programme was the training of teachers. Working 
with local authorities, UNICEF organized in-service training for thousands of primary school 
teachers. International subject-matter experts were hired to train teacher trainers from zonal 
authorities around the country. A trainer’s manual was developed for each subject and a 19-
day course was designed to train all lower primary school teachers in the country, using a 
trainer of trainer’s model. Teachers were trained in Somali language, mathematics, science, 
and social studies, as well as later in Arabic language and Islamic studies. Training included 
child-centered, gender-sensitive instruction, as well as other instructional management 
techniques and data collection for Educational Management Information System (EMIS). 
Gender training was a central component. The training was designed as part of a three-year 
package of courses that would upgrade teachers’ skills, providing them with the skills and 
certification equivalent to completion of a teacher training college programme (UNICEF 
n.d.). Despite these important efforts, however, the question must be raised about the 
sufficiency of 19 days of training, given the weak educational base of many teacher trainees. 
Supervision 
Teachers and community education committees (CECs) need leadership, mentoring, and 
support. Realizing this need early on, UNICEF, UNESCO, and a number of NGOs 
supervised schools when they were able. In the late 1990s, government authorities in the 
Somaliland and some parts of the Puntland began to place supervisors to oversee schools. 
 
More systematically, UNICEF and Education Sector Cluster (ESC)/Somali Aid Co-
ordination Body (SACB) partners began a programme of training a cadre of supervisors. The 
initial target was to prepare supervisors for 1,500 schools throughout the country. Supervisors 
were trained for a range of activities with which they were tasked, including community 
mobilization, collection of EMIS data, distribution of educational supplies, managing 
educational resources, improving school environments, and training of CEC members 
(UNICEF n.d.). 
School facilities 
Most schools were severely damaged, destroyed, or looted during the conflict. Facilities were 
rehabilitated using whatever funds were available. Building standards varied widely. Schools 
often lacked latrines, making them unsanitary for all and especially unfit for girls. UNICEF 
developed guidelines for safe, low-cost school buildings made of locally available materials. 
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Construction supervisors were trained in rehabilitating school facilities. In addition, materials 
were developed to encourage parents, teachers, and school directors to make improvements to 
schools to make them safe, clean, and child friendly (UNICEF 2010; Cummings 2003; 
UNICEF 2002; UNICEF n.d.). 
Community education committees 
A key component of UNICEF’s thinking about schooling in Somalia is organizing 
community support. This is especially important in the absence or fragility of government in 
parts of Somalia in recent years and the ultimate unsustainability of international support. 
Accordingly, communities have been encouraged to establish CECs, made up of local 
volunteers. CEC members may include parents, religious leaders, members of women’s and 
youth groups, or businessmen and women. CECs are trained by school supervisors in 
leadership, school management, and administration. The running costs of schools are seen as 
the responsibility of local communities. Most schools in the country now have CECs. 
 
As a result, communities own and/or manage almost half the schools in the country. 
Remaining schools are owned by local authorities and in some cases private individuals. 
NGOs also manage a number of schools. Community ownership has been particularly 
important in the CSZ, where local government structures are the weakest (UNICEF n.d.). 
Community management of schools and responsibility for finance helps ensure that schools 
can sustain themselves when government is unable to do so. 
Educational Management Information System 
Lack of data was one of the greatest challenges to work in Somalia’s school system. There 
was no information on how many teachers or children there were; how many schools were in 
operation; what facilities were available and needed; etc. UNICEF worked with local 
education officials and NGOs to initiate an annual national survey of data on primary schools 
in all three zones. The surveys use standard instruments to collect data on pupils, classes, and 
schools. All primary school teachers, head teachers, and supervisors have been trained in use 
of the forms, and successful surveys have been carried out for several years. 
 
UNICEF has also worked with regional officials to provide computers and training in the 
compilation of data and its use in planning and policy making (UNICEF n.d.). UNICEF and 
UNESCO have used the data to plan textbook distribution and teacher training. 
 
In terms of provision of educational services, these efforts have largely worked. UNICEF is 
the largest educational provider in the country. Primary school enrollment, for example, 
increased from 464,780 children in 2006‒07 to an estimated 763,320 children in 2009‒10.  
37 per cent of new enrollments were girls. 60 per cent of primary school students were 
reached with UNICEF-organized teaching and learning supplies (UNICEF 2010).  
4.2 Why has the programme worked? 
The success of the UNICEF education programme can be understood as a function of several 
factors: 
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Role of local context 
Almost all of UNICEF’s work in Somalia required adaptation of interventions to the local 
context. Indeed, because Somalia’s central government had failed, working in the local 
context and with local actors was the only way to work. Still, in several particular ways, 
UNICEF was able to take advantage of the local context to deliver education. 
 
Efforts were made to respect religious and cultural sensibilities and institutions. Curriculum 
developers worked to develop curricula that could be used in Koranic schools. Programmes 
were developed to develop the instructional capacity of Koranic schools to teach a broader 
range of subjects consistent with a basic education curriculum. Religious leaders were 
consulted and engaged in educational efforts in local communities. 
 
UNICEF has a longstanding presence and enjoys legitimacy due to its focus on local needs. 
One reason for UNICEF’s success is its extended presence in Somalia. Within its mandate, 
no other agency has matched the consistency, breadth, and depth of UNICEF’s engagement 
with Somalia. UNICEF’s focus on services to children and mothers has given it an unusual 
legitimacy. In addition to education, UNICEF works in health, nutrition, and other related 
areas, thus adding credibility. These efforts reinforced each other, with UNICEF attending, 
credibly, to the needs of the child as a whole. 
Aid modalities 
Due to the collapse of the central government, modalities of assistance to the government 
were not an issue. Instead, UNICEF worked with a host of community-based organizations, 
international NGOs, and international agencies, often serving as the lead agency and co-
ordinating body. 
 
Parallel with support to schools and communities, UNICEF provided nascent sub-zonal and 
zonal education systems with variable levels of support in line with their developing capacity 
and ability to absorb new ideas and demands. While working to support education at the 
community level, UNICEF maintained close contact with regional education officials, 
assisting them as they assumed increased responsibilities for provision of education in their 
areas. Arguably, the capacity of zonal education offices supported by UNICEF enabled 
Somalia to receive the first federal grant to be allocated by the GPE. Indeed, the Mogadishu-
based Somali government has established a central education ministry for the first time in 20 
years, though the zonal education ministries are the most relevant to education in the 
respective regions. 
 
A reasonable effort was devoted to monitoring and evaluation, and subsequent correction. 
Given the challenges of access, the shifting security situation on the ground and very basic 
conditions in most of the country for much of the period under study, UNICEF allocated 
resources to following the implementation of its activities and evaluating the effectiveness of 
its programmes. Evidence of the effectiveness of this can be seen in the ongoing revision of 
its programme activities, at both the level of particular support, i.e., services in such and such 
a community, and at the macro level of learning how to implement an education programme 
in a context like Somalia. 
 
The breadth of activities was varied; components in particular areas were added following 
the acceptance of earlier components. Adopting a modular approach, UNICEF was able to 
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standardize components of its programme, while varying their roll out, thus maximizing 
scarce resources and variations and limitations in absorptive capacity. 
Local ownership of the programme/project 
As government had collapsed, fostering local ownership was the only way an external agency 
such as UNICEF could operate. 
 
UNICEF developed close partnerships with local NGOs and other local and regional 
organizations, which were able to reach diverse communities. Driven presumably by the 
absence of a functioning government with which to partner, UNICEF had no choice but to 
form partnerships directly with communities, local and international NGOs, and sometimes 
Koranic schools as well as religious leaders. In addition, the agency developed contracts with 
private businesses, and worked with various local authorities, as well as emergent zonal 
government structures. Through these partnerships, UNICEF was able to engage a range of 
available partners and to provide services to children, families, and communities who would 
otherwise be beyond reach. These organizations provided a kind of civil society infrastructure 
to support schooling and other services in the absence of formal national government. As 
nascent regional and sub-regional government structures emerged, UNICEF was able to 
partner with them to lay the foundation for a larger co-ordinated government effort. These 
multiple options allowed UNICEF and its international partners to take advantage of 
opportunities offered by the variety of organizations Somalia produced in the absence of 
government, building on Somalia’s vibrant civil and private sectors. 
 
Communities were given responsibility (and provided training) to assume a primary 
ownership and management role in schools. After the collapse of the government education 
system in the civil war of 1991, various community entities, such as NGOs, parents, teachers, 
businesses, and others, assumed responsibility for starting and running schools. Whatever 
schooling was offered was a result of some sort of community initiative. Even now, the vast 
majority of schools in Somalia are owned by a private individuals or groups. While such a 
radical (unintended) decentralization does ensure community ownership of schooling, the 
challenge is to ensure equity, quality, and access across varying circumstances. At the same 
time, it allows for considerable resilience in the system when government is absent or unable 
to provide support or when security conditions permit only local activity. 
 
Co-ordination was central to the success of UNICEF’s programmes. Co-ordination was 
critical and time-consuming as programmes and funding were co-ordinated with international 
agencies and NGOs working in education and other sectors; with the more than 100 partner 
agencies UNICEF worked within Somalia; with zonal and sub-zonal governments; and with 
bi- and multi-lateral funding agencies. Without active co-ordination these multiple efforts 
would have led to chaos, and the contributions partners have made at the local level would be 
unlikely to have manifested themselves as coherence at the system level. 
 
Under its co-ordination, UNICEF has helped to channel funds from a variety of funding 
agencies to support education in Somalia. Of recent note is five-year funding from the 
European Union (EU) and a grant from the GPE. The EU funding is particularly welcome 
because it provides longer-term support than past two- and three-year funding cycles, a 
consequence of instability. 
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Programme/project design 
Given the collapse of the government, UNICEF assumed many of the responsibilities of a 
functioning education ministry, ensuring that a full complement of complementary inputs 
were provided, sufficient to enable effective, if basic, classroom instruction. 
 
In the emergency phase, the best technology available at the time—school kits—were 
deployed to support instruction. As noted, the conflict had destroyed virtually all school 
infrastructure and supplies. School kits provided a basic set of supplies so that teachers could 
begin teaching almost anywhere. 
 
Later, a foundational curriculum was developed, its content carefully negotiated with 
stakeholders for use in both secular and Islamic schools. UNICEF supported development of 
a new curriculum for grades one to four in Somali schools. The curriculum, which became 
the de facto official curriculum of Somalia, covered basic concepts in the six core subject 
areas (Somali language, mathematics, science, social science, Islamic religion, and Arabic). It 
was presented in such a way as to promote child-centered teaching and learning as well as 
gender equity. Content and presentation were developed and negotiated with a broad range of 
stakeholders by a cadre of 40 Somali educators who travelled the length of the country in a 
two-year consultative process. Once developed, the curriculum was widely disseminated and 
used to train teachers. Key here is the appropriateness of the curriculum for the context, for 
learners, and for the multiple stakeholders of education at national and local levels. In 
preparing and negotiating the curriculum, UNICEF arguably leveraged its legitimacy to 
promote values of child-centered education, gender equity, and inclusion, doing so in a 
culturally-appropriate manner. 
 
A capacity development, i.e. training, strategy was developed to prepare teachers, head 
teachers, supervisors, and CEC members. Local actors involved in primary education—those 
in school, providing supervisory support to the school, and in the community—were trained 
in the curriculum and their responsibilities vis-a-vis education. 
 
A basic data collection system was established early on. Prior to UNICEF-supported data 
collection, no information existed on the numbers and locations of schools, the numbers of 
teachers and students, overall or by grade, gender, etc. The collection of data, and 
development of EMIS in regional education offices in the Somaliland and Puntland have 
allowed for better planning and targeting of services and helped in establishing the credibility 
of a system of schools in major parts of Somalia. The training teachers receive covers EMIS. 
 
UNICEF programming supported linkages between emergency provision and long-term 
development. Programming provided support to the system at four stages on the continuum of 
crisis to sustainable development: 1) emergency responsiveness; 2) access to and delivery of 
quality services; 3) development of institutions and system capacity at local, regional, and 
recently, national levels; as well as 4) participation and empowerment of users. These efforts, 
along with the systemic elements of curriculum, training, information, etc., provide 
conditions conducive to development of appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and 
administrative offices (UNICEF 2002). 
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Timing 
In contrast to contexts of development, conditions shifted rapidly during the protracted 
conflict. Reverses were common and cumulative progress slow. As a result, UNICEF had to 
operate with unusual flexibility in its programming. 
 
UNICEF varied the level and nature of its activities according to the capacity of the partner 
and the stability of the area at a particular time. UNICEF had sufficient information on 
varying conditions on the ground and sufficient flexibility in its programming that it was 
able, successfully, to modulate its support according to opportunity, need, and capacity. This 
flexibility meant that windows of opportunity could be exploited and partners mentored as 
conditions as their capacity developed and as conditions changed. 
 
Much of the work on education in emergencies and fragility assumes the presence of a 
working authority, even one with low capacity or ill will. In refugee contexts, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) may assume authority. In other contexts, there is often 
some governmental authority to work with. Parts of Somalia represent a case of complete 
government collapse for much of the period of study. 
5 Principles for working in crisis, conflict-affected, and fragile contexts 
Bi- and multi-lateral development assistance is premised on the existence of discrete 
functioning national states. International development, as carried out by intergovernmental 
and international agencies, does not work very well when states fail, as in Somalia, or their 
effectiveness is undermined by fragility. Yet the development and humanitarian needs of 
people living in such contexts are generally greater than of people living in developing states. 
Humanitarian assistance is used to respond to crisis situations, but longer-term strategies are 
needed to deal with protracted crises and with building a foundation for development when 
the state is ready. Those foundations are best laid early, during periods of substantial fragility 
and even conflict, before the state is ready to build on them. The development community has 
been learning how to do this, on the job so to speak, in part through the work of UNICEF and 
other agencies in Somalia and other fragile contexts. 
 
The INEE was established in 2000 to advocate for, generate and share knowledge about how 
to ensure the rights of children to education ‘regardless of crisis or conflict’ (INEE 2013). 
INEE has developed a comprehensive set of minimum standards for provision of education in 
emergency contexts along with guidance notes and other materials. The INEE working group 
on education and fragility has, among other things, worked to establish the concept of 
Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) programming (INEE 2013), and has recently articulated a 
series of principles, which may help in understanding the ways in which UNICEF’s education 
programme worked in Somalia. It should be stressed that as an emergent set of ideas, 
UNICEF’s Somalia work was as more of a precursor to the principles rather than a guide 
UNICEF had available to organize its work. Nonetheless, their formulation and compilation 
of these principles helps illustrate some of the ways UNICEF responded to the unique 
situation it faced from 1993 on. In many ways, the principles sum up much of the wisdom in 
UNICEF’s approach. 
 
Table 2 summarises INEE’s principles for CSE. Beside each point, we indicate whether, 
based on available information, UNICEF’s education programme appears to have adopted 
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this principle1. These criteria are meant to be illustrative rather than a checklist of 
requirements for conflict sensitivity. We indicate here whether the information reviewed for 
this paper provided evidence of this. 
Table 2: INEE guiding principles on integrating conflict sensitivity in education, policy, and 
programming in conflict-affected and fragile contexts 
Extent to which 
UNICEF’s education 
programme 
followed this 
principle 
Comment INEE criteria 
1 ASSESS: Conduct an education and conflict analysis or assessment to review: 
? In emergency context, 
extent of analysis is 
unclear 
• The broad conflict status or risk of conflict and the historical links 
between education and conflict  
? “ • How conflict affects education 
? “ • How education might contribute to conflict 
? “ • How education can mitigate the conflict dynamics 
2 DO NO HARM: Education interventions in conflict-affected and fragile contexts are not neutral: They may reduce or 
increase the risk of conflict. Ensure that: 
 
 
? 
Extent of conflict 
analysis unclear, 
though clearly 
programme staff 
understood situation 
• Policy priorities, plans, and programmes are based on a comprehensive 
conflict analysis 
 +  Unclear how explicitly 
providers were aware 
• All education providers apply conflict sensitive programming 
++ Great effort to help all • Programmes do not intentionally favour one group over another 
+ Major efforts to include 
all 
• Education is not manipulated to promote exclusion and hate 
+++ Major efforts to foster 
gender equity 
• Education does not reflect and perpetuate gender and social inequities 
+++ Strong aspect of 
programme, by 
necessity 
• Education programmes respond to diverse local priorities and take 
account of the particular context 
+++ By necessity an 
inclination 
• Community participation is prioritized 
  
                                                
1 It should be noted that the principles were articulated after UNICEF implemented its Somalia education 
programme. The attempt here is to use principles of best practice subsequently articulated to retrospectively 
assess UNICEF’s programming.  
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Extent to which 
UNICEF’s education 
programme 
followed this 
principle 
Comment INEE criteria 
3 PRIORITIZE PREVENTION 
? Unclear, extent which 
UNICEF could act 
• Protect teachers and students from attacks and recruitment into armed 
forces 
? “ • Protect learning environments from attacks 
? “ • Focus on safety for students and teachers 
+ Yes • Support policies to protect girls and boys, young women and men from 
abuse and exploitation 
++ Yes, later in 
programme 
• Provide alternative education for youth, including life and employability 
skills 
? Unclear • Educate on risks such as landmines and unexploded ordnance 
? Unclear • Build emergency preparedness and readiness through Conflict and 
Disaster Risk Reduction  
4 PROMOTE EQUITY AND THE HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD AS A CITIZEN 
++ Major effort to reach all • Promote equitable distribution of services across identity groups (ethnic, 
religious, geographic, gender) 
++ “ • Avoid pockets of exclusion and marginalization 
? Unclear  • Focus on the re-integration of out of school children and youth 
+(+) Efforts made to 
develop good basic 
curriculum and buy-in 
from all 
• Deliver teaching and learning for peace through pedagogy, curriculum, 
and materials that are free of gender and social prejudices and build 
competencies for responsible citizenship, conflict transformation, and 
resilience 
? Unclear • Provide psycho-social protection for children 
+++ By necessity and 
inclination 
• Involve parents, communities, civil society, and local leadership 
5 STABILIZE, REBUILD, OR BUILD THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
+++ Explicit strategy, as 
possible  
• Strengthen institutional systems; staffing capacity and competencies 
++ Major component • Strengthen the process of supplying and training teachers (and teacher 
trainers) 
 
++ 
EMIS a major 
component 
• Strengthen the Teacher Development Management Information System, 
the EMIS, and teacher salary systems 
++ 
 
Efforts to increase 
female teachers 
• Ensure adequate number of trained teachers who reflect the diversity of 
their societies (different ethnic and religious groups, as well as gender). 
+ As possible • Provide safe, relevant, appropriate, continuous education to children and 
youth in accordance with the INEE minimum standards, aligned with 
national priorities 
+ Through CECs • Favour fairness, transparency, and accountability 
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Extent to which 
UNICEF’s education 
programme 
followed this 
principle 
Comment INEE criteria 
6 ACT FAST, RESPOND TO CHANGE, AND STAY ENGAGED BEYOND SHORT-TERM SUPPORT 
+ Ongoing effort • Develop flexible education financing mechanisms to adjust to 
contingencies 
 
+ 
Attempts to foster 
sustainability, reduce 
dependence 
• Be ready to adjust assistance programmes to eliminate negative impacts 
on the context and to improve contributions to peace 
+++ By necessity • Respond to changing conditions on the ground such as displacement or 
attacks 
 
+++ 
Strong effort, by 
necessity; UNICEF 
was lead in education 
• Co-ordinate with existing education co-ordination structures (e.g., the 
education cluster and/or local education group) 
 
+++ 
Handover strategies a 
critical component 
• Respond to national priorities and jointly prepare exit strategies for 
handing over of emergency education interventions to longer term 
education systems development 
? Implicit in programming • Ensure that existing commitments are respected 
?  • Recognize the links between education, development objectives, state-
building and security  
Notes: +++ major characteristic of intervention; ++ important principle underlying intervention; + 
utilized in intervention to some extent; ? extent to which utilized in programming intervention is 
unclear. 
Source: INEE 2013. 
 
Examined in this way, UNICEF’s education programme in Somalia exemplified many of the 
principles later articulated by INEE. The programme was particularly careful, it seems, in 
terms of principles 4, 5, and 6, i.e, promoting equity and holistic development of the child; 
stabilizing and rebuilding the education system; and acting fast, responding to change, and 
staying engaged. UNICEF also devoted considerable effort to principle 2, to do no harm, 
particularly in not favouring one group over another and paying close attention to cultural 
values. Less clear is the attention given to systematic analysis of the conflict situation. 
 
In addition to the existing principles, our overview of UNICEF’s work in Somalia might 
suggest additional principles, as follows: 
 
1. Work at two levels, as necessary, to support both service delivery at the local level and 
development of administrative capacity at aggregate levels of the education system. 
 
2. Bridge the gap between crisis/fragility and development. To the extent possible, short-
term activities should lay the groundwork for longer-term sustainability. 
 
3. Organize programming for flexibility; the capability to capitalize on opportunities; to 
deliver variable combinations of programme components; to establish and nurture 
partnerships; and to make changes according to shifting conditions on the ground. 
 
Also the importance of co-ordination is highlighted. Co-ordination was both necessary and 
challenged by the number and complexity of organizations operating in or on behalf of 
Somalia and the posting of UNICEF/Somalia staff in Nairobi. 
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6 Scaling-up 
Looking at its low scores on social indicators of development, Somalia between 1991 and 
2011 was surely one of a handful of the world’s least hospitable environments for education. 
The country lacked a central government and the education system had collapsed. Enrollment 
and gender equity ratios were among the lowest in the world. It was and is a conservative 
society, and the majority of the population still leads a pastoralist lifestyle. 
 
There are surely many ways in which UNICEF could have done more or better, many of 
which remain in the realm of the counterfactual. Still, UNICEF managed to support 
educational services to varying extents throughout the country, capitalizing on windows of 
opportunity afforded by the shifting security situation and vibrant public culture of Somali 
locality. 
 
Rather than a model to replicate, UNICEF’s education programme in Somalia offers a series 
of principles for consideration in designing education programmes in contexts of extreme 
state failure. While few states have failed as thoroughly as Somalia did, most countries have 
more or less substantial pockets of persistent state failure, where the state does not or cannot 
extend its reach. The extreme case of Somalia forced UNICEF and its partners to develop 
new strategies for educational development under the most adverse of circumstances. The 
principles from the Somali experience may be more generalizable than to state failure at the 
national level, but may apply, in varying degrees, to residual pockets of failure to provide 
locally. 
 
Uvin suggests that scaling-up is a matter of widespread impact at a low cost: 
 
Increased impact is a function of the coverage of a population, program effectiveness 
(quality of implementation and efficacy of interventions employed), efficiency (cost 
per beneficiary), sustainability (continuity, ownership), and equity (reaching the 
hardest to reach, usually the poor) (Uvin 2005: 5). 
 
Success in providing education in emergency contexts may be less a matter of defining an 
effective model of provision and then replicating it widely. UNICEF’s school kits were useful 
only to a point. However, its modular approach to educational components appears to have 
worked rather well. The trick may be to organize providers for flexible provision, sensitize 
them to the variable needs of local contexts, and keep an eye on both the local and the 
systemic, the short-term crisis and long-term development and sustainability.  
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